Abstract-The privacy of communicating entities in wireless ad hoc networks is extremely important due to the potential of their being identified and subsequently subjected to attacks (e.g., in military networks). Previously, random walk and fractal propagation schemes have been proposed to address privacy of source and destination nodes in ad hoc or sensor networks. Entropy of packet transmissions has been used as the metric for comparison. In this paper, we show that under a global attacker that can eavesdrop on the overall data transmissions and count them, neither of these approaches provide sufficient privacy when the attacker can visualize the transmissions and infer contextual information. Moreover, we show that the entropy is not a useful metric in such a case. We propose SECLOUD: Source and Destination Seclusion using Clouds to obfuscate the true source/destination nodes and make them indistinguishable among a group of neighbor nodes which works well even under network-wide traffic visualization by a global attacker.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious traffic analysis and privacy attacks against source and destination nodes in ad hoc networks are passive and difficult to detect in large wireless ad hoc networks [1] . Moreover, contextual information about network traffic patterns can be devastating in privacy-sensitive application scenarios. For example, in a military ad hoc network in the battlefield, command centers could be communicating with each other through an ad hoc network of intermediate nodes. Analysis of traffic in such an environment may reveal the locations of command centers enabling the adversaries to launch targeted cyber or physical attacks on them. Hence, it is more critical to hide the location of the source as well as ensure the privacy of destination for quasi-stationary nodes in ad hoc networks. Spreading the network traffic among several paths is also a first step countermeasure against traffic analysis attacks. Different methods have been proposed in the literature for defending against traffic analysis and location privacy related attacks [2] - [5] . We note that most of the research work assumes that all packets are encrypted link-by-link, padded to hide potential packet types through size, and use anonymous routing schemes to avoid detection of routes during route set-up.
However, most existing solutions to protect privacy of source or destination nodes do not consider the possibility of attackers having a complete view of the network traffic, in which case they fail to work well. In this paper we address the problem of secluding source/destination nodes in the presence of an attacker with complete view of the network topology and traffic. In wireless ad hoc networks, attackers can be broadly classified as either local or global. A local attacker can generally eavesdrop on transmitted packets around one 978-1-4244-4671-1/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE node at a time and it does not know the overall network topology, whereas a global attacker is able to visualize the overall network topology and is capable of network-wide traffic rate monitoring and time-correlation attacks. Networkwide rate monitoring attack involves counting the number of transmitted/received packets around every node in the network, while time-correlation attacks involve finding the communication patterns by analyzing latencies between packet transmissions around nodes in the network.
In this work, we propose a simple and efficient technique for source/destination privacy against such a global adversary. The proposed protocol, SECLOUD: Source and Destination Seclusion using Clouds, hides the source and destination nodes in a group of nodes (called "cloud") that are indistinguishable. The performance of SECLOUD is evaluated assuming a global attacker model capable of using network-wide traffic visualization. We compare SECLOUD with two commonly used privacy techniques, Random Walk and Fractal Propagation [2] , [6] . SECLOUD provides better privacy than either scheme in the presence of a global traffic visualization attack. We show that entropy, which is a common privacy metric, is not always an adequate measure of anonymity strength and also quantify the privacy level using anonymity and unlinkability metrics. Our simulations show that SECLOUD has a lower overhead compared to the fractal propagation and random walk schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work on popular privacy techniques. The attacker model, network assumptions, and privacy metrics are presented in Section 3. The details of SECLOUD protocol are explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents the simulation set-up and results discussion. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous works on privacy mechanisms for ad hoc wireless networks provide some level of protection against attackers by thwarting traffic analysis attacks and misleading attackers with randomized or fake traffic [1] - [4] , [6] - [8] . However, several of these approaches deal with location privacy in wireless sensor networks where the entity to be protected is the sink node [2] , [5] or the sensing sources only [6] - [8] .
Random Walk: Kamat et al. [7] and Ozturk et al. [9] proposed techniques based on a random walk approach for source location privacy in sensor networks against an external local adversary. Xi et al. [6] developed an improved random walk that starts from both source and sink. The random walk operates by forwarding packets probabilistically from the source through an unpredictable route to reach the destination [6] . Using erratic per-packet route is very effective in resisting rate monitoring attacks by adversaries monitoring a limited set of nodes. The random walk increases the time to trace the source location. Thus the source can communicate privately with the destination for a longer time. However, it is hard to completely obfuscate the general trend of the traffic flow towards the destination.
Fractal Propagation: Deng et al. [2] have proposed fractal propagation to counteract local rate monitoring and correlation attacks in sensor networks. Fractal propagation overcomes one of the drawbacks of the random walk scheme by introducing fake packet spreading to combat time correlation attacks [2] . When a neighbor node overhears a packet transmission, it probabilistically generates a fake packet with k-hop lifetime and forwards it to one of its neighbors. The propagation distance k of the fake packets causes network traffic to appear spread out along different routes resulting in tree-like transmission paths that are more diffused However, fractal propagation cannot totally obfuscate traffic patterns near the source and destination area, because real packets diverge from the source node and converge towards the destination node. Thus, a global attacker visualizing the network-wide traffic can discover the source and destination regions as we show later.
In [10] , a path confusion algorithm is used to increase source location anonymity against a local adversary. Mehta et al. in [3] proposed a privacy scheme under a global attack model by hiding the real source among k -1 fake sources simulating the mobility pattern of real sources in sensor networks. In [8] , under a global attack, the authors proposed statistically strong source anonymity by employing networkwide dummy messages. In [4] , the authors introduce a similar approach with carefully chosen dummy traffic to hide the real event sources in combination with mechanisms to drop dummy messages to prevent explosion of network traffic. The amount of dummy traffic, and location and number of fake sources are important factors that determine the effectiveness of the aforementioned privacy mechanisms.
III. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Network model
We consider an ad hoc network with nodes being distributed in a grid like manner (or randomly). Our assumptions are very similar to most related work in the literature. The IEEE 802.11 standard for physical and MAC layers is assumed. All the MAC, IP, and routing protocol messages are assumed to be encrypted so that no leakage of information occurs. In [11] the authors used short-lived disposable MAC addresses to prevent the real node IDs from being revealed to adversaries. A similar technique will be assumed in this paper to avoid any identification of nodes. We assume the existence of a key management protocol that can distribute pair-wise keys between nodes or public-private key pairs for each node [12] , [13] . Any of these schemes can be used to set up pairwise keys and authenticate nodes' relationship, but we omit such details here in this paper. Each packet is encrypted and authenticated so that an adversary cannot decrypt or modify the contents of an 978-1-4244-4671-1/09/$25.00 ©20091EEE eavesdropped packet transmission. All packets are transmitted in the same format and have the same length (e.g., by padding). Route discovery communications are assumed to be anonymous using one of many anonymous routing protocols [14] - [18] . An anonymous routing protocol allows neighbor nodes to authenticate each other without revealing their identities. For example, in [14] the anonymous neighbor authentication is based on dynamically changing pseudonyms of nodes instead of their real identifiers or MAC addresses. Anonymous route discovery and data forwarding employ pairwise shared link identifiers between neighbor nodes which are created and established during neighborhood authentication.
B. Attack Model
An external and global attacker model is assumed in this paper that has the capabilities of different existing attack models described in [2] , [3] , [19] . The attacker has complete knowledge of network topology and can keep measurements for all of the network traffic. We assume that the global attacker can perform packet rate monitoring and time correlation for all traffic in the network (which is a stronger attack than corresponding ones assumed elsewhere). The attacker will visualize all transmitted/received packets in the network and determine the traffic density on every link in the network. However, the attacker is passive and cannot compromise nodes. A possible method for this attack is by deploying an overlay network with several malicious nodes simply to sense traffic from the given ad hoc network, similar to the idea in [3] . These nodes can collect information and collaborate with a centralized entity using a different band. We consider a single source and destination in the network that makes it easiest for an attacker to identify them, but SECLOUD can be deployed with multiple sources and destinations as well.
c. Privacy Evaluation Metrics
We compare SECLOUD, random walk and fractal propagation using the metrics -anonymity, unlinkability [19] , and entropy.
1) Anonymity:
Anonymity A is defined as the probability that a node of interest is incorrectly identified in an anonymous group [19] . If a node is hidden among A nodes that have the same behavior, then the level of anonymity is A == 1 -(11A).
If the attacker estimates that the source-destination pair is in the anonymity sets AI, A 2 , ... An' where IAI is the size of a set A and n is number of sets, then, the anonymity level for this node of interest is given by A == 1-
2) Unlinkability: We employ a 3-D graph of transmitted data around nodes with which a global attacker can visualize the existence of communication between a source and destination. More powerful edge detection algorithms are also possible (we show one example). Details are provided in Section v.
3) Entropy: Entropy, a common metric for quantifying uncertainty in information theory, is often used as a privacy measure [2] . It is a scalar number that does not capture the amount of contextual information, such as paths analysis, that discloses hints about the location of source and destination nodes.
IV. THE SECLOUD PROTOCOL
The general idea of SECLOUD, is to seclude the source and destination node locations within a cloud of irregular shape that is constructed using its neighboring nodes. The details of this protocol are explained next.
First, the source node S broadcasts a hello message to discover all its one-hop neighbors N(
where m is the total number of neighbor nodes. Then, the nodes in N(l, i) discover their respective neighbors N(2, i) which are two-hops away from node S. Consequently, source node S constructs the list:
where N (k, i) is the set of k t h hop neighbors of node S. This initialization process of neighbor discovery is done periodically by all nodes in the network. This will ensure that the attacker cannot determine which of the nodes performing the initialization will be the source. Let the cloud region be of maximum width k hops from the source. For e.g, with k == 3, source node Swill randomly select a number of nodes, B, such that B{
This enables reducing overhead compared to schemes that use dummy transmissions everywhere or by every node and keep the region irregular -the source cannot be predicted to be in the center of the cloud for example. The nodes in B will be marked as pseudosources in the cloud and are requested to transmit encrypted dummy packets at a rate similar to the source transmission rate and to forward real packets when available from source to delegated sources (see next). Dummy packets are simply dropped. The destination node D which also does the same initialization procedure will construct a cloud. Note the size of the source and the destination clouds can be different by using different values of k for each, depending on the privacy strength needed on each side.
Node S randomly selects one or more nodes from the set B to act as delegated sources. Similarly D randomly selects one or more nodes in its cloud to act as delegated destinations. We consider the case of one delegated source/destination as a special case in Section V. Delegated sources find routes to delegated destinations using a suitable anonymous routing protocol (e.g., see [14] ). In any case, local broadcasts/relays from S to the delegated sources and from the delegated destinations to D ensure delivery of data locally. Nodes in B are picked such that there is connectivity between Sand the delegated sources. A similar strategy is employed in the destination cloud.
With the above set-up, SECLOUD achieves source/destination privacy in a local region. In single source-destination scenario, the global attacker will have to guess the source or the destination from the set of nodes B which is the cloud size. To improve privacy, SECLOUD can create fake sources and fake destination clouds as well. The fake sources/destination clouds will behave in a manner similar to the real S-D clouds and will communicate with each other. In the best case, paths between fake source/destination clouds will intersect the real traffic flow. Fake clouds increase the likelihood of misleading the attacker who may attack (e.g., by jamming) the fake regions instead of the real regions. When there are multiple sources and 978-1-4244-4671-1/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE destinations with different traffic paths crossing each other in the same time period, fake clouds may be omitted. Nodes in the real source-destination clouds and all the nodes in the fake source-destination regions will need to be loosely synchronized so that the global attacker observes packet transmissions in the same time period.
V. EVALUATION
We simulated a large network of 400 nodes distributed in an area of 2000m x 2000m with average node degree between 7 and 8. We employed the Quasi-Unit disk graph (Q-UDG) connectivity [20] with some percentage of perturbations and random distribution introduced for grid network topologies. The coordinates of each node x and Y were randomly chosen using uniform random variables in the ranges (X-PXi, X+pXi) and (y -PYi, Y +PYi), respectively, where P is the perturbation parameter and Xi and Yi are the spacing between the nodes in the x and Y directions, respectively ( P == 0.2 and Xi == Yi == m x 100 for integral m were assigned for all our simulations). For random node distribution, the coordinates of the nodes x and Y were randomly and independently chosen in the range from 0 to 2000 m. After the nodes are distributed, the Q-UDG connectivity model and transmission range is used to determine the network topology. A link exists between two nodes if the inter-nodal distance d is less than ali, where R is the transmission range of the node and a is the Q-UDG factor (0 :s; a :s; 1). In our simulation we set a == 0.2. For distances d greater than R, there is no link connectivity. However, for aR < d :s; R, the link will exist with probability (R -d)I (RaR). The source node is randomly chosen from the region (100m :S;x:S; 900m) and (100m :S;y:S; 900m) and destination node is randomly selected from (1100m :S;x:S; 1900m) and (1100m :S;y:S; 1900m)of the network. The source sends 5000 real packets in a time window of T seconds. All simulations are repeated 15 times and results are averaged for each tested scenario.
Metrics: If node i transmits u.; packets and a total of V packets were transmitted in the network in time T, the fraction of packets sent by i is Pi == u.; IV and the entropy is defined as H == -Li Pi log2 Pi. We determine unlinkability and anonymity as follows. To visualize linkable communications, the attacker can simply plot a 3-D graph of the number of packets transmitted by each node in time T with the approximate location of each node. A second approach is to convert this information into an image and use an edge detection algorithm to reveal source/destination locations as well as the communication route. We show an example of the Canny edge detection algorithm [21] , which is a popular image processing approach in computer vision. The algorithm first smoothes the image to eliminate noise pixel intensities and finds the image gradient to highlight regions with high spatial derivatives. It then tracks along these regions and suppresses any pixel that is not at the maximum (non-maximum suppression). The gradient matrix is further reduced by hysteresis thresholding. Finally, to better quantify linkability, the attacker will sample n of the nodes that have the highest number of packets transmitted in T and computes the average value U of packets transmitted. Then nodes that transmit at least j3U 18 16 Fig. 2. Random Walk P; = 0.7 -marking nodes same conclusions can be extracted by the global attacker from these figures. We omit some of these graphs for subsequent privacy techniques (fractal propagation and SECLOUD).
The overhead cost with random walk (average from 15 simulations) is shown in Table I In Fig. 1 , a matrix of the number of packets U i transmitted by each node i is shown for random walk with P r = 0.9 (sample of one simulation). Nodes are not located exactly as shown but their relative positions are maintained in the matrix. The source node S (yellow color) sends 5000 packets to destination node D (blue color). Using n = 10, (3 = 0.5, we find (3U = 2072 and mark all nodes transmitting more than (3U packets. As shown in in Fig. 1 , the entire route is revealed . The edge node at the source is even more apparent as it will have a global maximum (highest traffic density node). The destination is one-hop away from the next highest traffic node with packet count 4065. In Fig. 2 , we reduce P; to 0.7 and repeat the process. In this case (n = 10, (3 = 0.5, (3U = 2130), yields a fuzzy region. We reduced (3 to 0.3 resulting in (3U = 1278 and a sharper set of paths is obtained as shown in Figures 2 and 4 . The privacy is increased since more than one communication path appears to exist. The destination node can be guessed to be near three nodes with U i 'S 1985, 1802 and 3448 and destination anonymity is 2/3 (i.e., IAj = 3). The source node packet count is still a global maxima in its area and can still be detected. The 3D traffic graph for this case is shown in Fig. 3 . The output of the edge detection algorithm is shown in Fig. 4 . The packets are marked where 0 < (3 < 1. A graph of nodes, the number of packets transmitted and the marked nodes is used to determine possible communication paths, sources, and destinations. We pick n = 10 in our simulations. The values of nand (3 will create sharp or fuzzy boundaries in the graph.
Based on these boundaries, we count the size of jAI -the number of nodes within which the source and destination are hidden. In the case of random walk we do not include the nodes at the boundary of the network in picking n or marking nodes, as this would cause bias due to packet transmissions bouncing back.
A. Random Walk Technique
With random walk, [2] , [7] , packets are forwarded in a random fashion from one hop to the next until they reach the destination. The route taken by each packet from source to destination is unpredictable. A probability (0.5 ::::; r; < 1.0) is used at each hop to decide how random the forwarding is.
If P; = 1.0, there is no randomness and the packet is sent to next hop node on the shortest path to the destination.
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978-1-4244-4671 -1/09/$25 .00 ©2009 IEEEsame table. The transmission overhead (TO) is the ratio of total number of packets transmitted that with the shortest single path transmission from a fixed source to a fixed destination 13 hops away. The transmission overhead can be as high as 466 % with for P; = 0.5. Even with P; = 0.7, the overhead is 234% and the anonymity and unlinkability is not adequate. Although, the entropy values increased with decreasing P n they provide little information about the achieved privacy.
B. Fractal Propagation Technique
In fractal propagation, neighbor nodes along a forwarding path from source to destination generate fake packets with probability Pjake , and the fake packets are propagated K hops by successive neighbor nodes randomly selected. A higher (Pjak e, K) is expected to enhance communication privacy with extra overhead. 0  11 48 151 411 1010 1615 1100 3049 1036 1441 695 198 134  5  0  0  0  0  0  16 131 153 714 1518 5000 51845518 3955 1691 14ffi 901 194  1  0  0  0  0  0  11 81 194 935 1151 4%9 8810 7907 5144 4110 1133 836 100  1  0  0  0  0  0  11 61 364 10511816 5160 9041 8948 8193 53651651 1141 394  14  3  0  0  0  0  5 49 193 1000 1390 4899 6990 9117101ffi 6918 3605 1590 510  49 14  1  0  0  0  3 34 111 113 1801 4111684481968198 8153 4809 1304 811  115 40 10  3  0  0  1 11 116 4641336 3196 6561 8841840190166111 3183 1631  395 101 10  6  0  0  0  8 both still be located using the same methodology (for n = 10, (3 = 0.5, in this case (3U = 4710). The results of traffic visualization for one simulation sample by marking nodes (n = 10, (3 = 0.5, (3U = 3197) is shown in Fig. 5 for Pjak e = 0.1, K = 5. We can identify a single source node (yellow color) transmitting 5000 packets to the destination node 13-hops away, denoted by cell D (blue color).
The 3D traffic graph shown in Fig. 6 , illustrates a similar result where the peak traffic nodes are aligned. The anonymity is zero since the source-destination locations are both distinguishable by a global attacker. The destination node is just l-hop away from the node with packet count 5759 .
In Fig. 7 , for the same source and destination nodes, a higher probability of fake packet generation (P j a k e = 0. The overhead cost of the fractal propagation protocol is shown in Table II . The transmission overhead (TO) is again the ratio of total number of packet transmissions to that with shortest single path transmission from a fixed source to a fixed destination 13 hops away. The number of different fake paths produced by fake packet propagation and the mean entropy values are also shown in the same table. For the shortest single path case, the entropy computed is 3.985.
Obviously as Pjak e is increased and K is increased, the overhead will be significantly increased . Even Pjake = 0.3 and K = 5 results in a high transmission overhead (TO) of 1159 %, but the anonymity and unlinkability is poor. The mean entropy values increase but provide no real information about privacy.
In comparison with fractal propagation, the unlinkability with random walk is better when P; is decreased. As illustrated in Fig. 2 the series of local maxima nodes tend to be irregular which make it harder for the global attacker to follow the traffic flow precisely.
TABLE II BFP TRANSMISSION OV ERH EAD
C. SECLOUD
Next we test SECLOUD under identical circumstances as random walk and fractal propagation, with and without fake clouds.
First we consider a single delegated source and single delegated destination (gray cells) in Fig. 8 . A cloud size B < 4k(k +1) was chosen in the case of grid networks where k is the selected random hop distance from the source/destination. With k = 3, we picked B = 20 for this simulation. As it was designed to perform , two irregular clouds of identical broadcasting nodes of 5000 packets (highlighted in red) are formed around the source and destination. This will ensure the location privacy of the source and destination among their 0  51  25  5  0  140  57  18  9  378 163  58  23  591 392 133 28  993 474 196  46  1354 636 186 50  1646 629 228 54  1058 507 207  64  836 496 240 91  262 150  67  9  58  20  7 0 source-desti nation pairs (highlighted in gray) , which also mean there are 5 transmission paths. Although using multiple paths is more complex to manage and setup, it has two advantages compared to single path. In the case where an attacker is resident on a path, using several disjo int paths will explicitly avoid that attacker. Moreover, using multiple paths will distrib ute the load of broadcasti ng the packets by intermedia te nodes on those paths. The multiple paths also increase the unlinkability of the real source-destination pair. The anonymity level is similar to the case of SECLOUD with single path, as described previously. Fig. 11 shows sample results for SECLOUD (single path with a fake source-desti nation pair). Compared to the previous case without a fake cloud, the attacker now not only needs to guess the location of the source within a cloud, but it also has to select the correct cloud and the guess the real source within it. The anonym ity level in this case is doubled with one fake source-destination, and the unlinkability of real sourcedestination is higher. Moreover, it is not clear which cloud is the source and which is the destination.
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cloud regions, since the source could be any node inside the cloud, i.e., not necessarily at the center or the edge . The probability for a global attacker to guess the location of the source will be IItotal number of nodes in both clouds. Note that the size of the clouds B can be adjusted by the SECLO UD protocol, which means that the anonymity can be controlled . The Iinkability will not lead the attacker to the real source or destinatio n, but only to the irregular cloud broadcasting region. In Fig. 12 , we show a sample result with multiple paths and one fake source-destination pair. In addition to having all the benefits of the previous approac hes, this approach further increases the unlinkability between the real source-destination pair.
D. Summary of Results and Comparison
The transmission overhead (TO) performa nce, entropy (E) values and anonymity level of several cases of SECLOUD In Fig. 10 , we show a sample resul t for multiple delegated sources and delegated destinations. Fig. 10 again shows two irregular clouds of nodes broadcasting 5000 packets (highlighted in red) formed around the source-side and destinationside. The real source sends 5000 packets using five delegated Table III . Using fake sourcedestination pairs will approximately double the overhead compared to the case without using any fake source-destination. As the cloud size increases, the anonymity will increase but so will the overhead. The overall energy consumption of nodes is directly related to the amount of transmission overheadthe higher the overhead the larger the energy consumption. Compared to fractal propagation where the minimum overhead is 475%, SECLOUD adds a fixed lower overhead as shown in Table III but provides better seclusion for both, source and destination nodes. The random walk protocol has an average overhead of 234% which is less that of SECLOUD. Combining random walk with cloud creation is a possibility under consideration. The entropy values of SECLOUD for all cases do not give a clear measure of the level of privacy of source and destination nodes as shown in Table III . These values are less than the entropy values for fractal propagation and random walk.
We have run the simulations for cases of lower node degrees (e.g., 5) and the results show that the CLOUD formation is not impacted. The difference is that distance between the nodes in the cloud will be larger (for brevity, the results are not included here). In all the simulation results shown, we have used a grid network. However, for a random network in which the X and Y position of each node is independently and randomly using a uniform randomly distributed variable, the results of SECLOUD, Fractal and Random walk are relatively similar. For brevity, we have not included the results in this paper.
Protecting privacy in the single source-destination case is more difficult compared to multiple pairs of sourcedestination. In the case of more than one real sourcedestination pairs, SECLOUD will have more pairs of clouds. If the attacker is targeting a specific source-destination, then the task of the attacker is also to select the correct sourcedestination from the correct cloud region. Note that to achieve privacy with more source-destination pairs, the sources have to start transmission roughly at the same time. Otherwise, a global attacker can monitor the network at time Tl when the first source-destination is activated and then monitor the network at time T2 when the second source-destination is activated. If a node on the path between source and destination cloud is attacked or jammed, this is expected to have minimal impact. A new delegated source can be used to connect to a new delegated destination. We can also use several different paths for transmission from the source cloud to the destination cloud.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented a protocol to address the problem of source-destination privacy in the presence of a global and powerful attacker with network-wide traffic knowledge. We 978-1-4244-4671-1/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE compare it with fractal propagation and random walk and show that it performs better than fractal propagation and favorably with random walk in terms of overhead, anonymity, and unlinkabili ty.
